Motion for a more definite statement.

1.   The order to appear specifies an injunction. No proposed injunction is attached to the complaint, and there is no mention of an injunction anywhere in the complaint, which is captioned as a complaint for fine. Since injunctions are equitable and fines are matters of law, this is a difference which makes a difference, not mere terminology. If this is a case about an injunction, defendants asks to be fully informed of what injuctive relief is sought.

2. The second sentence of the order states, "And the Court, having read the same and being duly avised in the premises, finds that to personally serve a copy of the Notice on said Defendant and make his due return thereof."

I don't understand this; what does it mean?

3. It appears that the court has issued its order ex Parte. Is this proper?

4. What is the jurisdiction of ths court and nature of this action; is this  civil or criminal or something else? If civil, why the threat of a body attachment or bench warrant contained in the Return on Order?

Motion to dismiss without predudice for failure to exhaust adminstrative remedies.

Motion to dismiss with prejudice on the basis that section 10 is inapplicable to the premises at 4015 E Washington St., which is governed by section 19 of the code.

Motion for appoitment of counsel. Move to below.

4015 E Washington St. (Highway 40) is zoned C-5, for moderately heavy commercial uses.
It is the site of Stewart's Salvage Company, a small recycling operation. Defandant Robbin Stewart has owned and operated Stewart's Salvage Company since 1979, at various locations. It has been at 4015 E washington for 4 or 5 years.

The "rubbish and junk" itemized in the citation on  Feb 21 were inventory  and tools of the salvage company in its normal operation. Those items have now been processed and sold or moved inside.
One man's trash is another man's treasure.

The attempt by H &H to apply residential standards to a commercial operation is an inappropriate
interference in commerce and is ultra vires.

In operating a recycling company, defendant is exercising liberty interests protected by Article I section 1 of the Indiana Constitution.

Section 1. WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal; that
they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that
all power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments are,
and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for
their peace, safety, and well-being. For the advancement of these
ends, the people have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and
reform their government.

"the right of liberty and pursuing happiness secured by the [Indiana] constitution, embraces the right, in each . . . individual, of selecting what
he will eat and drink, in short, his beverages, so far as he may be capable of producing them, or
they may be within his reach, and that the legislature cannot take away that right by direct
enactment." Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545, 558 (1855).

see also http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3724&context=ilj,
"Natural Rights'--A Constitutional Doctrine in
Indiana, Monrad Paulsen. 25 ILJ (1950.)
I
2

In bringing this action, Bibbs and her coconspirators are seeking to violate my civil rights








On july 10th 2013 I received a summons and complaint, 49F1213050v016716.

That complaint contained as an exhibit a citation TRA13-01528 dated 2/21/2013.

This was my first actual notice of the citation.

I neither admit nor deny constructive notice; I am denying actual notice prior to July 10th.

Defaut judgments are disfavored as a matter of public policy in Indiana.


Sec. 22-201. Persons charged with an ordinance violation of The Code are entitled to a
trial before a court as provided by law, unless the person waives the right to trial and enters
an admission of the violation with the violations clerk or his designee.
[Gen.Ord. 17-1996(A) Passed 11/20/96 Effective Date 11/1/96]
Sec. 22-202. If a person charged with an ordinance violation wants to exercise the right to
a trial, the person shall appear before the violations clerk, or his designee and deny the
violation or enter a written denial with the clerk. The person's notice to stand trial shall be
given by the date indicated on the citation which date shall not be less than seven days after
the issuance of the citation. Upon receipt of the person's intent to stand trial, the official
having the responsibility to prosecute ordinance violations cases for The Corporation shall
be informed. Lawsuits shall be commenced as described in Chapter 21.
[Gen.Ord. 17-1996(A) Passed 11/20/96 Effective Date 11/1/96]


Article 8. Right To Appeal; Timely Demand, Parties; Evidence.
Sec. 21- 801.
(a) A person to whom an administrative notice of violation is issued is entitled to an
administrative hearing on that matter upon timely demand for a hearing


Sec. 21-802.
(a) The person seeking an administrative hearing must timely demand, in writing, a
hearing before the administrative law judge in order to obtain an administrative
hearing as a matter of right.
(b) If such persons fail to timely demand an administrative hearing, the Health Officer’s
notice becomes a final order and may be judicially enforced.

I have previously filed, in another matter, perhaps pertaining to 30 or 34 N Hamilton St., an ongoing written demand for an adminstrative hearing in each and every case in which the H&H brings against me.

Search Ind. Code § 16-22-8-31 : Indiana Code - Section 16-22-8-31: Public health division; director; powers; enforcement of orders; petition for isolation or quarantine; venue

• Search by Keyword or Citation

 

(a) The director of the division of public health has the powers, functions, and duties of a local health officer.
(b) Orders, citations, and administrative notices of violation issued by the director of the division of public health, the director's authorized representative, a supervisor in the division, or an environmental health specialist may be enforced by the corporation in a court with jurisdiction by filing a civil action in accordance with IC 16-42-5-28, IC 33-36-3-5(b), IC 34-28-5-1, IC 36-1-6-4, or IC 36-7-9-17.
(c) A public health authority may petition a circuit or superior court for an order of isolation or quarantine by filing a civil action in accordance with IC 16-41-9.
(d) Unless otherwise provided by law, a change of venue from the county may not be granted for court proceedings initiated under this section.
(e) A change of venue from a judge must meet the requirements in IC 34-35-3-3 for court proceedings initiated under this section.
As added by P.L.2-1993, SEC.5. Amended by P.L.184-2005, SEC.34; P.L.88-2006, SEC.4; P.L.138-2006, SEC.5; P.L.194-2007, SEC.3.

The 11th circuit tells me there's been no motion for reconsideration filed in Andrew Worely v Florida Secretary of State. So maybe the Institute for Justice is just going to let it drop, or maybe they are going to go directly for certiorari. Paul Sherman, lead counsel, says they haven't decided what they will do next. I think it's a good case for a cert petition. We should know within 75 or so days. If they do petition for cert, I'd be looking for someone to coauthor an amicus with.
I'm not a member of the Supreme Court bar, and I'm not set up to print briefs in the format the court requires, but otherwise I know pretty much what I want to say.

It's a good case for cert because there is a longstanding split between circuits as well as states, and CU has left this area of law very muddled. I can't be certain there are 5 votes, but it's the ACLF and Watchtower majorities again, most likely.

I need to sit down and write myself a memo on why the cert petition should focus on part II of the decision, the disclaimer issue, instead of part I, the disclosure issues, because, while it is a more minor point to the plaintiffs, it is more certworthy. If I can get those thoughts in order I can then share them with IJ.
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