Bolstering petitioners' claim, our law has long recognized that the home provides a kind of special sanctuary in modern life. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Amdts. 3, 4; Lawrence, 539 U.S., at 562, 567, 123 S.Ct. 2472; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-568, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969); Griswold, 381 U.S., at 484-485, 85 S.Ct. 1678. Consequently, we have long accorded special deference to the privacy of the home, whether a humble cottage or a magnificent manse. This veneration of the domestic harkens back to the common law. William Blackstone recognized a "right of habitation," 4 Commentaries *223, and opined that "every man's house is looked upon by the law to be his castle of defence and asylum," 3 id., at *288. Heller carried forward this legacy, observing t

- mcdonald v chicago.

Held: The Constitution does not prohibit States from insisting upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Pp. 2383-2388.

indiana v edwards 2008

See also McKaskle, 465 U.S., at 174, 104 S.Ct. 944 (describing trial tasks as including organization of defense, making motions, arguing points of law, participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing the court and jury).

The American Psychiatric Association (APA) tells us (without dispute) in its amicus brief filed in support of neither party that "[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant's ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation even if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant." 

Third, in our view, a right of self-representation at trial will not "affirm the dignity" of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel. McKaskle, supra, at 176-177, 104 S.Ct. 944 ("Dignity" and "autonomy" of individual underlie self-representation right). To the contrary, given that defendant's uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling. Moreover, insofar as a defendant's lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial. As Justice Brennan put it, "[t]he Constitution would protect none of us if it prevented the courts from acting to preserve the very processes that the Constitution itself prescribes."

Further, proceedings must not only be fair, they must "appear fair to all who observe them." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). An amicus brief reports one psychiatrist's reaction to having observed a patient (a patient who had satisfied Dusky) try to conduct his own defense: "[H]ow in the world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?" Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Massey, 348 U.S., at 108, 75 S.Ct. 145 ("No trial can be fair that leaves the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental condition stands helpless and alone before the court"). 

I'm going to go way out on a limb and predict that Kavenaugh will get confirmed.

so now we'll have a roberts court with, usually, 5 solid votes for a conservative agenda. whatever that will be.

will mccain-feingold long survive mccain? will mcconnell v fec part II go differently?

how about buckley v valeo? does justice thomas have 3 more votes to rethink that case?

ten unclean hands

1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
6.   
7.   
8.   
9.   
10.
1.     paper matches

2.     50 prior cases

3.     previous perjury
4.     false allegation of contempt, compelled client's address.
5      torture at cca
6.    home invasion
7.    clean and lien - stole car and stuff.
8.    home invasion today with warrant.
9.     small claims
10.   drop a dime - stool pidgeons, ratfinks.
denial of hearing - 30 prior times
1.   denial of hearing - this time
2.   ex parte with a gun
3.   general warrant instead of tailored to situation
4.   misrepresented smith facts at hearing
6.   conspired with miller to violate my civil rights
7.   likely bill of rights - indiana and federal - violations
8.   likely - 4th 5th 6th a violations. then 7th? or section 20. or 19.
likely, or at least alleged, state bill of rrighs violations.

9.   
10.

“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6 (2013). “At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” Ibid.

“The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.” California v. Ciraolo,

When a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Jardines,
Such conduct thus is presumptively unrea- 6 COLLINS v. VIRGINIA Opinion of the Court sonable absent a warrant.
The Court already has declined to expand the scope of other exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home.
A plain-view seizure thus cannot be justified if it is effectuated “by unlawful trespass.”
Given the centrality of the Fourth Amendment interest in the home and its curtilage and the disconnect between that interest and the justifications behind the automobile exception, we decline Virginia’s invitation to extend the automobile exception to permit a warrantless intrusion on a home or its curtilage
sotomayor, colloins, 2018

That “their … houses” was understood to mean “their respective houses” would have been clear to anyone who knew the English and early American law of arrest and trespass that underlay the Fourth Amendment. The people’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure in their “houses” was drawn from the English common-law maxim, “A man’s home is his castle.” As far back as Semayne’s Case of 1604, the leading English case for that proposition (and a case cited by Coke in his discussion of the proposition that Magna Carta outlawed general warrants based on mere surmise, 4 E. Coke, Institutes 176—177 (1797)), the King’s Bench proclaimed that “the house of any one is not a castle or privilege but for himself, and shall not extend to protect any person who flies to his house.” Semayne v. Gresham, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 93a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198 (K.B. 1604). Thus Cooley, in discussing Blackstone’s statement that a bailiff could not break into a house to conduct an arrest because “every man’s house is looked upon by the law to be his castle,” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 288 (1768), added the explanation: “[I]t is the defendant’s own dwelling which by law is said to be his castle;
scalia, minnesota  v carter, 1998.

today my stalker came to my house with a man with a gun.  she came in, had a court order, took pictures of the two bedrooms and front porch, as sort of agreed to at a previous hearing.

This was an ex parte contact outside the presence of counsel.

Did she conspire with Miller?

the adminstrative warrant was overbroad, and would have been subject to a motion to quash, if i had had prompt service.

still to do
motion in limine